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The British Labor
Government's Industrial
Relations Program
A.W.J. THOMSON* AND P.B. BEAUMONT**
In the last two years a new phase has begun in the development of
the British industrial relations system, carrying forward a public debate
which has now lasted for over a decade. The early 1960's saw the identi-
fication of industrial relations as an important component in Britain's
poor economic performance. The Donovan Commission of 1965-68'
pointed out that the largely autonomous "traditional" system, based on
industry-wide institutions, had been overtaken to a significant extent by
an informal, decentralized system composed of fractional bargaining at
the plant level, and that had produced inflationary results. The Com-
mission's analysis was generally accepted, and a search then began for
a means of bringing the system under more direct influence and control.
The possibilities for reform of the industrial relations system, which
were not mutually incompatible, were: (1) a predominantly voluntary
reorganization of the institutions of collective bargaining to formalize
the emerging new structure; 2 (2) incomes policies designed to restrict the
* Senior Lecturer, Department of Social and Economic Research, Glasgow University.
B.A. 1959, Oxford University; M.S. 1961, Ph.D. 1968, Cornell University.
** Ph.D. candidate, Department of Social and Economic Research, Glasgow Univer-
sity. B.Ec. (Hons.) 1971, M.Ec. 1973, Monash University.
1. ROYAL COMMISSION ON TRADE UNIONS & EMPLOYERS' AssociATiONS, REPORT OF THE
COMMISSION (DONOVAN REPORT), CMND. No. 3623 (1968). There is a helpful symposium on
this Report in 6 BRIT. J. INDUS. REL. 275 (1968).
2. This was the main recommendation of the Donovan Commission, which argued that
a comprehensive legal framework would be unworkable until voluntary institutional re-
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inflationary tendencies of the system; and (3) a reconstruction of the
legal basis of industrial relations, including in particular constraints on
undesirable bargaining activities. From the viewpoint of 1968, the first
of these seemed to have too lengthy a realization span to bring short-
term relief, while the second was partially discredited by the experience
of incomes policies during the 1960's. Hence, legal reform of the system
seemed a sensible development.
To some this approach was even seen as an alternative to a more
direct macroeconomic demand management policy, but this soon
proved illusory. The confrontations caused by the Labor Government's
1969 legislative proposals and the Conservative Government's Industrial
Relations Act of 1971, 3 both of which contained restraints on bargaining
behavior, are themselves complex stories which have been detailed else-
where.' Nevertheless, the successful campaigns by the labor movement
in these confrontations had important implications for the future. In
essence, they helped to politicize the labor movement, driving it to
exercise more fully its powerful but hitherto largely latent influence
within the Labor Party, and gave it considerable confidence that it
could defend itself against attempts to impose restrictions. The move-
ment thus became more willing to give up its old distrust of the law and
seek to use the law for its own ends.5 In this context it was becoming
clear within the labor movement that collective bargaining as practiced
in Britain had severe limitations as a means of achieving new rights and
standards for large sections of the labor force. The existence of unioniza-
tion had created narrow rights for a limited group; for instance, it had
not prevented many millions of dismissals annually, did not give the
right to be a union member, and gave only very limited protection in
related fields such as health and safety. By about 1973, therefore, the
Trade Union Congress (TUC) saw considerable advantages in legislation
in these and other areas.
form had been achieved; the Commission did, however, implicitly assume the existence
of a continuing incomes policy.
3. Industrial Relations Act 1971, c. 72 [hereinafter cited as Industrial Relations Act].
4. For the history of the Labor proposals, see P. JENKINS, THE BATTLE OF DOWNING
STREEr (1970). For the story of the Industrial Relations Act, see A. THOMSON & S. ENGLE-
MAN. THE INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS ACT: A REvIEw AND ANALYSIS (1975); B. WEEKES, M.
MEI.IISH. L. DICKENS & J. LLOYD, INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS AND THE LIMITS OF LAW (1975).
5. The Trade Union Congress (TUC) had long argued that even favorable legislation
would carry with it the danger of the quid pro quo of legislative control of union activities.
See the evidence of the Trade Union Congress to the Donovan Commission. ROYAL COM-
MISSION ON TRADE UNIONS & EMPLOYERS' ASSOCIATIONS, SELECTED WRITTEN EVIDENCE 142
(1968). Moreover, the TUC was undoubtedly influenced in its changing views by the
success of the "unfair dismissal" sections of the 1971 Act. Industrial Relations Act §§ 22-
26.
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It was this shift of the TUC which has characterized the new phase
in the British system, and its significance can perhaps best be illus-
trated by utilizing Kahn-Freund's three functions for labor law:' (1)
being auxiliary to, or assisting the processes of collective bargaining; (2)
restricting or constraining collective bargaining activities; and (3) regu-
lating or providing statutory standards in areas which might be sub-
jected to collective bargaining. Under the traditional system, until the
1971 Industrial Relations Act, there had been very little law and what
existed was negative in character.7 The Labor proposals of 1969 and the
1971 Act, by contrast, included a mixture of restrictive and auxiliary
law, and the present phase comprises regulatory and auxiliary law. The
categorization is not entirely clear-cut, but nevertheless the change in
emphasis has been very clear. Parallel to these changes in legal ap-
proach can be seen a more general move from the traditional sui generis
British model to what might be termed the American model, i.e. decen-
tralization of bargaining involving institutional reconstruction but in-
corporating a framework of restrictive behavioral law, and to what
might be called the European model, i.e. greater stress on statutory
intervention to set minimum terms and conditions of employment with
a movement towards new concepts of industrial democracy and corpo-
rate accountability.
The Labor Party's industrial relations program was explicitly built on
a "social contract" with the TUC, whereby the TUC was enabled to
incorporate its social policy objectives into Party policy in return for
assistance in curbing inflation. We shall return to the "social contract"
later," but for the TUC perhaps the most vital part of the program was
the restructuring of industrial relations legislation. After a series of
meetings of the TUC-Labor Party Liaison Committee in April 1973 the
TUC issued a detailed statement of its statutory objectives. In June
1973 this was refined in a further statement suggesting the need for three
separate pieces of legislation:10 (1) a "Repeal Bill" to repeal the 1971
Industrial Relations Act, (2) an Employment Protection Bill to extend
6. Kahn-Freund, Industrial Relations and the Law-Retrospect and Prospect, 7 BRIT.
J. INDUS. REL. 301 (1969).
7. Three leading Acts, the Trade Union Act of 1871, 34 & 35 Vict., c. 31, the Conspiracy
and Protection of Property Act of 1875, 38 & 39 Vict., c. 86, and the Trade Disputes Act
of 1906, 6 Edw. 7, c. 47, had created restrictions on legal circumscription of union activi-
ties. They, in turn, were the result of political action by the union movement. See A.
Thomson, The Reaction of the American Federation of Labor and the Trades Union
Congress to Labor Law, 1900-1935 (unpublished dissertation, Cornell University, 1968).
8. See note 150 infra.
9. TRADE UNION CONCRESS, INDUS. REL. REv. & REP. No. 54 (April 1973).
10. REPORT OF THE TUC GENERAL COUNCIL (1973) at 106-107.
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the rights of workers and unions, and (3) a Companies Bill to include
provisions for extending industrial democracy. This three-part frame-
work was duly adopted by the Labor Party in its manifesto for the
general election of February 1974, and immediately after it assumed
office the new Government announced its intention of implementing
these measures. We shall deal with each of these central planks of the
Government's program in turn before turning to various other important
aspects of legislation dealing with industrial relations issues.
I
THE TRADE UNION AND LABOUR RELATIONS ACT"
When the Labor Government took office in March 1974, its first objec-
tive was to repeal the 1971 Industrial Relations Act as quickly as possi-
ble, to pave the way for more substantive legislation in succeeding Par-
liamentary sessions. Some unions wanted a simple repeal measure to
expunge the Act from the statute book, but this would not have re-
created the pre-1971 legal climate since the unions' pre-existing immun-
ities at law would not have been replaced. There were also some limited
parts of the 1971 Act which both the Government and the TUC wished
to retain and even strengthen, notably the sections dealing with unfair
dismissal. The Parliamentary situation was a further factor, since the
Government was a minority one, and thus in no position to introduce
major new initiatives. The general intention of the Bill, therefore, was
stated by its sponsor, Mr. Michael Foot, the Secretary of State for
Employment, as a return to "the excellent laws that prevailed for quite
a long time, some of these introduced in 1875 and some of them in
1906."11
A. PROVISIONS OF THE BILL
The Bill proposed to repeal the whole Industrial Relations Act and
then provide for the reenactment of certain sections. Among the provi-
sions slated for abolition were the institutions other than the industrial
tribunals, e.g., the National Industrial Relations Court, 3 the Commis-
sion on Industrial Relations,"4 the Registrar of Trade Unions and Em-
11. 1974, c. 52 [hereinafter cited as Trade Union & Labor Relations Act]. For a de-
tailed analysis of the Act, see B. PERRINS, LABOUR RELATIONS LAW Now (1975).
12. The Times (London), May 1, 1974, at 9, col. 8.
13. This Court was created by the Industrial Relations Act § 99. Under the Bill, appeals
from tribunals were to be heard by the High Court pending the establishment of an
Employment Appeal Tribunal under the Employment Protection Act. See note 42 infra
and accompanying text.
14. The Commission on Industrial Relations was established by the Industrial Relations
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ployer Associations,'5 and the Industrial Arbitration Board;'" the system
of unfair industrial practices except unfair dismissal; the statutory pro-
cedures for recognition; the emergency procedures; the framework of
rules for registration; the abolition of closed shops; the imposition of new
procedures; the obligation to disclose information; the right not to be a
member of a trade union; and so on. With these went the American
influence which had been so prevalent in the Industrial Relations Act.' 7
Four other major sets of provisions were designed to replace the old Act.
First, the Bill redefined the status of unions and employer associations,
giving them protection against restraint of trade cases but requiring
them to register for administrative, accounting, and tax identification
purposes. Second, the Bill proposed a series of provisions to deal with
legal proceedings against unions and employers associations. Some of
these essentially restated the 1906 Trade Disputes Act, giving unions
immunity to actions in tort, actions for inducement of breach of con-
tract'" and suits against peaceful picketing,'6 while others proposed new
provisions which placed restrictions on the granting of ex parte injunc-
tions, required the parties to state their intention that collective bar-
gaining agreements be enforceable, and widened the meaning of the
Act § 120. The work of the Commission on Industrial Relations was taken over by a new
body, the Advisory Conciliation and Arbitration Service, set up on a non-statutory basis
in September 1974 and later incorporated into the Employment Protection Act. See notes
35-38 infra and accompanying text.
15. Appointment of such a Registrar was authorized by the Industrial Relations Act §
63. Under the Bill, registration functions were returned to the Registrar of Friendly Socie-
ties, where it had previously been since 1870.
16. See Industrial Relations Act § 124. The Industrial Arbitration Board (IAB) was to
be left in existence under the Bill until its functions were taken over by the Central
Arbitration Committee under the Employment Protection Act. See Employment Protec-
tion Act 1975, c. 71, § 10, and notes 40-41 infra and accompanying text.
17. For an extensive review of the influence of American labor law on the Industrial
Relations Act, see Gould, Taft-Hartley Comes to Great Britain: Observations on the
Industrial Relations Act of 1971, 81 YALE L.J. 1421 (1972).
18. A loophole had been opened in the immunity for inducing breach of contract in the
Trade Disputes Act of 1906, 6 Edw. 7, c. 47, § 3, by differentiating between inducing the
breach of contracts of employment, which was permissible, and inducing breach of com-
mercial contracts, which was not. J.T. Stratford & Son v. Lindley, [1965] A.C. 269;
Torquay Hotel Co., Ltd. v. Cousins, [1969] 2 Ch. 106. The Industrial Relations Act §§
128-30, continued this distinction, but the Labor Government's bill made a change in its
reenactment of the provision to extend union immunity to the commercial contracts
situation as well. For a further elaboration of this highly complex issue, see PERRINS, supra
note 11, at 1 310-38.
19. The original intention had been to widen the powers of pickets by giving them the
right to stop vehicles, but this was withdrawn when the strength of opposition to it was
recognized. See note 158 infra. Moreover, the Bill omitted the right to picket a person's
home, which had been removed by Industrial Relations Act § 134(1)(b).
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term "trade dispute" beyond the narrow definition in the 1971 Act.
Third, the Bill proposed some purely transitional provisions to handle
the phasing out of the Industrial Relations Act institutions. Fourth, the
Bill proposed to reenact and extend various aspects of the Industrial
Relations Act, notably the unfair dismissal provisions and the functions
of the industrial tribunals. The more important extensions of the pre-
vious legislation were to eventually reduce the qualifying period for
unfair dismissal applications from two years to six months, to include
constructive dismissal in the definition of dismissal, 20 to put the onus
of demonstrating reasonable cause for dismissal more firmly upon the
employer, to raise the upper limit of compensation, and to extend the
time limit for making an unfair dismissal complaint. A provision under
these sections which caused some dissension between the Government
and the TUC was a safeguard for workers with religious objections to
trade unionism dismissed in a closed shop situation.
21
B. PASSAGE OF THE BILL
All this was intended to be relatively uncontroversial. However, the
passage of the Bill through-Parliament was far from uneventful, degen-
erating at one stage into what can only be described as a constitutional
shambles, and its later repercussions, which still may be far from com-
plete, have produced the extremely rare threat to invoke the Parliament
Act of 1911 to override the House of Lords.
The Bill came relatively unscathed through its Committee stage, with
the notable exception of the reinsertion of the Conservative Govern-
ment's Code of Practice2  as a quasi-legal guide to good industrial rela-
tions practice. However, it ran into trouble at the Report stage of the
House of Commons and in the House of Lords, when Opposition Amend-
ments punched holes in the union legal immunity and closed shop provi-
sions.
At the Report stage in the Commons there were two votes against the
Government, the so-called "Lever amendments."' The first added safe-
20. Constructive dismissal is defined as the situation where "the employee terminates
that contract, with or without notice, in circumstances such that he is entitled to termi-
nate it without notice by reason of the employer's conduct." Trade Union & Labor Rela-
tions Act sched. 1, 5(2)(c). Such a definition of dismissal had in fact already been made
under the Industrial Relations Act. See Sutcliffe v. Hawker Siddeley Aviation, Ltd.,
119731 I.C.R. 560, 564.
21. The term "closed shop" in Britain covers both of the American terms "closed shop"
and "union shop."
22. Code of Industrial Relations Practice (1972), reprinted in C. HEATH, A GUIDE TO THE
INDUSTRIAL. REIATIONS AcT 1971 at 229 (1971).
23. A senior member of the Government, Mr. Harold Lever, was "nodded through" for
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guards for workers dismissed in a closed shop situation and added sev-
eral vague terms to the law which threatened to make nonsense of the
whole legal concept of the closed shop. 4 The second widened the mean-
ing of a union membership agreement to include not only the signatory
unions but also "another appropriate independent trade union.""5 The
five amendments in the House of Lords continued in the same vein.
Three new sections were created, dealing with exclusion or expulsion
from union membership, setting out rule requirements for unions and
employers' associations, and permitting resignation from a trade union.
The effect of these was to recreate some of the much-disliked organiza-
tional principles which were a prerequisite for registration under the
1971 Industrial Relations Act. 6 The fourth amendment destroyed the
extension of immunity for inducing breach of contract to commercial
contracts as well as contracts of employment," while the last narrowed
the meaning of the term "trade dispute" by excluding trade disputes
occurring outside Britain.
Thus, although the major part of the Bill was passed, the Government
was far from satisfied, and the Queen's speech announcing the Govern-
ment's legislation program for the ensuing Parliamentary session prom-
ised a bill to remove the offending amendments. The short Trade Union
and Labour Relations Amendment Bill followed within a month, pro-
posing to remove or severely modify all the amendments except that
dealing with the Code of Practice, which the Government proposed to
reissue in a new form. Once again, however, the Government ran into
severe difficulties. At the Committee stage of the House of Commons
the debate centered around two matters: first, the Bill's proposal that
the review body for hearing complaints of workers excluded or expelled
from union membership be run according to Trade Union Council rules
rather than remain a statutory appeal body, 8 and second, the Opposi-
two votes in accordance with House of Commons practice for those Members of Parlia-
ment who are ill but on the premises. This produced a tie vote in both cases, and the
Speaker again followed normal practice in voting for the Government. It was later proved,
however, that Mr. Lever was not on the premises at the time, and his votes therefore had
to be discounted, giving victory to the Opposition.
24. This amendment added one provision concerning "reasonable" objections to a par-
ticular trade union and another adding memberships of other "appropriate" trade unions
to the small loophole of religious objection which the Government had been willing to
allow. See text accompanying note 21 supra. The problems arose in connection with the
vagueness of the terms "reasonable" and "appropriate."
25. The Opposition had not expected these amendments to be passed, and therefore
little attention had been given to the difficulty of interpreting the terms used.
26. See, e.g., Industrial Relations Act §§ 61-62.
27. See note 18 supra.
28. See Industrial Relations Act §§ 99, 107. Under the Bill proposal the review body
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tion's contention that certain employees having special employment
duties and responsibilities, notably newspaper editors, should be ex-
empted from a closed shop agreement.2 9 These two arguments were
fused together in the long-debated problem of ensuring "press freedom"
in a closed shop situation." The Government was loath to concede that
the press was a "special case" requiring a special clause under the closed
shop dismissal provisions and was even more loath to accept the possi-
bility of a legal clash with a union trying to impose such a dismissal.3 '
However, the Government won the Commons vote by accepting by
amendment the possibility that individuals or groups of employees
might be excluded from closed shop agreements by agreement of the
parties concerned, thus being protected from a closed shop dismissal,
and even promised to introduce legislation in the future if a closed shop
was used to restrict press freedom. Passage in the House of Lords was
quite another matter. The Lords has always had an anti-Labor majority,
but on the issue of press freedom the attack on the Bill was led by a
Labor sympathiser and close friend of the Prime Minister, Lord Good-
man, who was also chairman of the Newspaper Publishers' Association.
Thus emboldened, the Lords for the first time since 1949 took their
opposition to its ultimate and refused to pass the Commons Bill. There
was a long and highly public interchange between Mr. Foot and the
Lords and, although both sides made compromises, the end of the Par-
liamentary session found the difference between them as "narrow but
incredibly important. '3 In opposition to the Government, the Lords
wanted to protect journalists by specifying in advance the broad con-
tents of a charter of press freedom to be negotiated within the industry
and by reinforcing the protection which the common law could give to
complainants who suffered from breaches of that charter.
The result of this clash may be expensive for the Lords. The Govern-
would also have an independent chairman. The Opposition was opposed since, it argued,
the Bill's proposal gave no rights against the employer for an individual dismissed under
closed shop provisions.
29. Under such an exemption newspaper editors could not fairly be dismissed for not
being union members.
30. The debate reflected the fear of a possible tough line from the increasingly powerful
and militant National Union of Journalists (NUJ), which had indicated its desire to
impose a closed shop in the industry. However, an NUJ postal ballot during the debate
resulted in a vote in favor of allowing editors freedom of choice on NUJ membership. The
members also rejected a call for all future national and house agreements to provide for a
compulsory 100 percent union membership.
31. According to Government member Michael Foot the best way out of the "press
freedom" dilemma was by a charter signed by the involved parties, and not by legal
provision.
32. Lord Goodman, quoted in THE ECONOMIST, Nov. 8-14, 1975, at 31.
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ment has already made clear its intention to invoke the Parliamentary
Act of 191133 by which a bill passing the Commons in two successive
sessions can override the opposition of the Lords. The Bill itself was
immediately reintroduced and, by the time this article appears in print,
may well have become law. Moreover, the issue reawakened Labor oppo-
sition to the structure of the Lords and may well have accelerated con-
stitutional change. It is nevertheless significant that the division be-
tween the two sides ultimately went to the heart of the difference be-
tween Labor and Conservative philosophies, the one stressing the rights
of the group, the other of the individual.
II
THE EMPLOYMENT PROTECTION ACT
The Employment Protection Act34 is a voluminous, multifaceted piece
of legislation, the Labor Party's substantive replacement for the In-
dustrial Relations Act. Its two main objectives are to create a new struc-
oture of union rights and employer responsibilities in collective bargain-
ing and to provide a range of individual rights at work by giving statu-
tory minimum standards in areas where collective bargaining had pro-
duced a patchwork effect. While it was attacked for several reasons-for
being one-sided in its bias towards the unions, for the costs it would
impose on industry, and for the effect it would have on smaller busi-
nesses-most of the individual provisions were not strongly disputed in
themselves, and indeed the majority were generally accepted as being
desirable in principle. Certainly there was nothing like the opposition
that the Industrial Relations Act or even the Trade Union and Labour
Relations Act and Amendment Bill had produced. At the same time, the
Act is just as complex and formalistic as the Industrial Relations Act.
A. THE INSTITUTIONS
The Act has a number of "auxiliary" provisions, designed to
strengthen collective bargaining. The institutions have a distinctly fa-
miliar ring, although they are not the exact counterparts of the In-
dustrial Relations Act institutions. The Advisory Conciliation and Arbi-
tration Service (ACAS), set up in 1974 and given statutory backing
under the Act,35 was a juncture of the Commission on Industrial Rela-
33. 1 & 2 Geo. 5, c. 13.
34. Employment Protection Act 1975, c. 71 [hereinafter cited as Employment Protec-
tion Act]. For a previous discussion of the Act, see CCH DOING Bus. IN EUROPE 30,780
(1975).
35. Id. §§ 1-5 & sched. 1.
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tions and the Conciliation Service of the Department of Employment,
but has powers greater than both combined. It is charged with "the
general duty of promoting the improvement of industrial relations, and
in particular of encouraging the extension of collective bargaining and
the development and, where necessary, reform of collective bargaining
machinery. ' 3 More specifically, its functions are conciliation and arbi-
tration services, to give advice on any other matter concerned with
industrial relations, to investigate and recommend solutions to various
issues arising under the legislation, and to provide Codes of Practice for
guidance, some of which are explicitly written into the legislation. It is
independent of the Government, ' and indeed for many of its decisions
the Service is answerable to no one, not even the higher courts. Since
its inception, it has been notably successful in its conciliation and arbi-
tration roles, significantly increasing its caseload in both areas largely
as a result of strong backing from several unions including the powerful
Transport and General Workers Union.3 1
The ACAS also acts as an administrative base for two other institu-
tions: the Certification Officer, whose major functions are the registra-
tion role and the certification of trade union independence,39 and the
Central Arbitration Committee, which performs arbitration functions
and acts as the final procedural stage for union recognition, disclosure
of information, and arbitration of union appeals over local pay norms."
The latter institution is potentially a very powerful one since it will have
the authority to dictate binding terms and conditions of employment for
groups of workers without any further recourse of appeal for employers.4'
The final new institution is the Employment Appeals Tribunal with
High Court status to hear appeals from industrial tribunals and the
Certification Officer." Although the Tribunal does not have original
36. Id. § 1(2).
37. The ACAS is controlled by a council of ten, six of whom are nominees of the TUC
and the Confederation of British Industry. The other four are public members. Employ-
ment Protection Act, sched. 1, 2.
38. Despite its current position, the service will have to walk a narrow tightrope in the
future since it will become unacceptable to the unions if it becomes involved in the
operation of incomes policy. It has so far rebuffed attempts to give it a monitoring function
in this area, but it may become difficult to prevent some arbitration issues from having
incomes policy implications. On the other hand, the Service will become unacceptable to
the employers if it appears to be too pro-union in such areas as recognition and disclosure
of information. The employers have, in fact, already threatened to withdraw.
39. Employment Protection Act §§ 7-9. This is likely in practice to be considerably
more than a nominal function, since the TUC has given notice of attack against the many
small unions which are akin to staff associations, especially in the white-collar field.
40. Id. § 10 & sched. 1, 14-27.
41. See id. §§ 10-21 & sched. 1, 27.
42. Id. §§ 87-88 & sched. 6.
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jurisdiction and cannot issue injunctions, it is the recreation in other
respects of the much-vilified National Industrial Relations Court of the
Industrial Relations Act period.43 The lower industrial tribunals are not
changed substantially by the Act other than being given the additional
function of interpreting and enforcing the individual rights aspects of
the legislation." By the continued expansion of their jurisdiction, these
tribunals are rapidly becoming general local labor courts.45
In summary, the Employment Protection Act creates a complex
framework of specialized industrial relations agencies, operated almost
exclusively by people with direct knowledge and experience of industrial
relations rather than lawyers or judges, of whom there is still considera-
ble distrust within the labor movement. There is an obligation upon
employers and employees to conciliate, and a good deal of scope for
discretion exists to accommodate particular situations. Much depends
on what is reasonable and equitable in the circumstances, and the de-
fense of impracticability is frequently available to the employer. 6 At the
same time, the rights created are positive ones, and when the question
of enforcement finally arises the sanctions are generally more direct
than the "cease and desist" orders so typical of the American system.
B. COLLECTIVE BARGAINING PROVISIONS
As is the case with the institutions, some of the Act's substantive
"auxiliary" rights strengthening collective bargaining replace provisions
of the Industrial Relations Act. The new machinery for union recogni-
tion, though substantially similar to the old Act in that it is based on a
loosely structured investigation by a tribunal, differs in two important
respects." First, only an independent trade union has the right to have
a recognition situation investigated by the ACAS, although the Service
43. Insofar as legal problems of industrial conflict do arise outside the functions of the
institutions, they will be dealt with by the ordinary courts. It is to be hoped that the
Employment Appeals Tribunal, as well as having specialized knowledge, will also be able
to reproduce the speed and informality of the National Industrial Relations Court as
opposed to the ponderous formality found in the ordinary courts.
44. See, e.g., Employment Protection Act §§ 27, 32, 38, 46, and 54.
45. The industrial tribunals were originally established under the Industrial Training
Act of 1964, c. 16, and since then a number of pieces of employment legislation have used
them for enforcement purposes. For purposes of the present legislation it is anticipated
that they will need to expand their membership from 1600 to 2500.
46. Thus, in Employment Protection Act § 101(2), dealing with redundancy procedures,
"it shall be for the employer to show-(a) that there were special circumstances which
rendered it not reasonably practicable for him to comply with any requirement of section
99 above; and (b) that he took all such steps towards compliance with that requirement
as were reasonably practicable in those circumstances."
47. Id. §§ 11-16.
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can take up an employer's reference at its discretion. Second, an appli-
cation can be made for "further recognition" to cover situations where
an employer may refuse to bargain on some topics while recognizing the
union in general terms. 8 Upon receipt of the union application, the
Service conciliates by consulting with all "parties who it considers will
be affected by the outcome of the reference" and makes "such inquiries
as it thinks fit."49 It may ascertain the opinions of workers "by any
means it thinks fit," but must follow certain procedures if it decides that
a formal ballot of the workers is necessary 0 Its findings are set forth in
a written report. If the Service recommends recognition and the em-
ployer refuses to comply with the order, the union may appeal to the
ACAS within two months." If conciliation does not produce a satisfac-
tory result the union may appeal to the Central Arbitration Committee
and obtain an award specifying the terms and conditions of employment
of those employees to whom the complaint relates.12 Such an award is
binding. The Act also provides for the revocation of a recognition order,
and on this occasion the employer is given the opportunity of making
an independent application.13 Nevertheless, employers have strongly
argued that the whole recognition process is unfairly one-sided. 4
The provisions relating to the employer's duty to disclose information
for collective bargaining purposes are very similar to those contained in
the Industrial Relations Act,55 although the relevant sections of the lat-
ter were in fact never activated. The Act does not contain specific disclo-
sure requirements; rather, the ACAS is instructed to produce a Code of
Practice on the subject. The employer, however, does not have to pro-
vide "any information the disclosure of which would cause substantial
48. Id. § 11(3). This additional recognition is limited to matters regarded as potential
subjects for trade disputes. The constraint on the extent of recognition has obvious paral-
lels to developments in the United States under Labor Management Relations Act § 8(d),
29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1970).
49. Employment Protection Act § 12(1).
50. Id. § 14.
51. Id. § 15(2).
52. Id. § 16(6).
53. Id. § 13(2)(b).
54. The Times (London), Sept. 14, 1974, at 3, col. 4.
55. Employment Protection Act §§ 17-21. See Industrial Relations Act §§ 56-57.
56. The extent of information which must be divulged was a contentious issue under
the earlier legislation, and this was largely responsible for the non-activation of the provi-
sions. The Commission on Industrial Relations did, however, issue a somewhat bland and
noncommittal report on the subject. COMMISSION ON INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, DISCLOSURE OF
INFORMATION (Report No. 31, 1973). The TUC has put forward an extensive "shopping list"
in this area, and its proposals will certainly carry considerable weight in the formulation
of the new code of practice.
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injury to the employer's undertaking for reasons other than its effect on
collective bargaining,""7 and need not allow inspection of specific docu-
ments, nor compile information which would involve work or expendi-
ture "out of reasonable proportion to the value of the information in the
conduct of collective bargaining." s Union complaints on employer un-
willingness to disclose are presented to the Central Arbitration Commit-
tee,"5 and the same procedure and sanctions apply as in the case of
refusal to recognize.
One element of the Act which has created considerable concern
among employers is the provision that pay levels and other terms and
conditions of employment may be raised to the norms in a local area if
".. . an employer is, in respect of any matter, observing terms and
conditions of employment less favourable than the recognised terms and
conditions or, where . . . there are no recognised terms and conditions,
[to] the general level of terms and conditions."" On an application by
a union, and failing successful conciliation, the claim goes to the Central
Arbitration Committee, which may impose new terms on the individual
contract of employment.6 ' This concept of extending terms is not new,"
but the Act extends laws previously applicable only to industry-wide
collective agreements. Even so, the provisions are not likely to have a
widespread effect since most groups of workers already have industry-
wide "recognised" terms and conditions and unions are unlikely to
abandon these agreements for the dubious benefits of the new proce-
dure. However, in the poorly-organized industries at the bottom of the
pay hierarchy, and also in the white collar field, there are possibilities
for making use of the new procedures.
Several facets of job security are extended by the Act, including the
obligation of employers to consult with trade unions before dismissing
any employees "as redundant."6 Consultation is required before all
57. Employment Protection Act § 18(1)(e).
58. Id. § 18(2)(b).
59. Id. § 19.
60. Id., sched. 11, $ 1. See also id., § 98. "Recognised" terms and conditions refer to
industry or district-wide collective agreements, id. sched. 11, 2(a), while the "general"
level refers to comparable employers in the same industry and district. Id. sched. 11,
2(b).
61. Id., sched. 11, 10.
62. The present legislation, in fact, replaces the Terms and Conditions of Employment
Act of 1959, 7 & 8 Eliz. 2, c. 26, § 8. The concept is also recognized in Europe, and, with
specific reference to federal contracts in the construction industry, in the Davis-Bacon Act
in the United States. 40 U.S.C. §§ 276a to 276a-5 (1970). For the problems and effects of
this type of legislation, see J. GOULD, DAVIS-BACON AcT: THE ECONOMICS OF PREVAILING
WAGE LAws (1971).
63. EMPLOYMENT PROTECTION Act § 99(1).
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redundancy dismissals, although the time period varies with the num-
ber of workers involved." The employer must submit a statement con-
taining the numbers of employees to be dismissed, the method of select-
ing them, and the procedure for dismissals, together with the reasons
for the proposals, considering and replying to any representations made
by the relevant unions. 5 In addition to consulting unions about redun-
dancies, employers must also notify the Secretary of State where there
are ten or more redundancies proposed, with time limits similar to union
consultation noted above, and failure to do this can result in both a fine
and a reduction of rebate from the Redundancy Fund.6 In these various
obligations, the employer may offer the defense of special circumstances
which "rendered it not reasonably practicable for him to comply" with
the requirements, 7 but such a defense is unlikely to be successful.
The last major set of provisions dealing with collective bargaining
relates to the position of wages councils, which are statutory bodies
covering lower-paying and poorly-organized industries.6 Instead of pro-
posing wage rates to the Minister, wages councils are now able to create
their own enforceable agreements, and, unlike in the past, have author-
ity over terms and conditions of employment other than pay and holi-
days. The Act also furthers the intention of phasing out wages councils
by allowing the parties to establish statutory Joint Industrial Councils
which have some of the features of the voluntary Joint Industrial Coun-
cil traditional to the British system but retain the wages council power
of enforceable orders.69 Such statutory Joint Industrial Councils can also
be abolished by the Employment Secretary if he believes that purely
voluntary machinery would be sufficient. 70
C. INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS
Important as are the collective rights created in the Act, it is the
64. Id. § 99(3).
65. Id. § 99(5)-(7). If these procedures are not followed, an industrial tribunal may issue
a "protective award" as a result of which the employees must be paid in for a period, not
to exceed 90 days, decided by the tribunal. Id. § 101(l)-(5).
66. Id. §§ 100(1), 104(1), 105(i). The Redundancy Fund recompensates employers for
half the redundancy pay given to workers under the Redundancy Payments Act 1965, c.
62.
67. Employment Protection Act § 101(2)(a).
68. Id. § 89-96 & scheds. 7 & 8. See generally F. BAYLISS, BRITISH WAGES COUNCILS
(1962).
69. Employment Protection Act §§ 90-91. The intention of phasing out the wages coun-
cils was also expressed in the Industrial Relations Act.
70. Employment Protection Act § 93.
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individual rights enumerated there which create the main regulatory
framework. Several of the rights created either reconstitute or extend
existing rights, but others are quite new, at least in the statutory sense,
since many similar and often more generous provisions exist in collective
arrangements. As a necessary complement to the collective rights noted
above, and as an extension of the Trade Union and Labour Relations
Act,7' individuals are given the right not to have action short of dismissal
taken against them in connection with membership of or activities in
an independent trade union and can appeal to an industrial tribunal
against any such actions.72 An exception exists where the union in ques-
tion is not party to a union membership agreement. 73 This latter term
may require further interpretation, since it includes both "agreements"
and "arrangements," and some of the "arrangements" which currently
exist in Britain are, to put it mildly, far from clear-cut.
Another area of extended rights relates to the "unfair dismissal" pro-
visions. These sections make several changes in prior law. They cover
several groups of employees previously omitted,7 5 allow a dismissed
employee to demand a written statement of the reasons for his dis-
missal,7 permit the remedy for unfair dismissal to be based on the
complainant's wishes and to include complete reinstatement,77 change
the method of computing the award, 78 and authorize interim relief when
dismissal is ostensibly for reasons connected with union membership or
activities.7 This last innovation is intended to revive or continue the
contract of employment until the case is heard, so that the employee is
in effect suspended rather than dismissed, and was introduced to head
off industrial action as a result of union-related dismissal.
Of the Act's new individual rights, that giving certain rights of guar-
anteed pay for short-term layoffs" is the most costly. It was estimated
71. See section I supra.
72. Employment Protection Act § § 53-56.
73. Id. § 53(4)-(5).
74. Id. §§ 70-80. The Industrial Relations Act also contained some "unfair dismissal"
provisions in §§ 22-26.
75. Several classes of employees were excluded from protection of the "unfair dis-
missal" provisions of the Industrial Relations Act. See Industrial Relations Act §§ 22(2),
27-31. The Employment Protection Act contains no such exclusions.
76. Employment Protection Act § 70.
77. Id. § 71. Reinstatement may not be ordered, however, where it would be impractica-
ble or where "the complainant caused or contributed to some extent to the dismissal
..." Id. § 71(6)(b)-(c).
78. Id. §§ 73-76. The amount of the award is divided into (1) a basic award, which varies
with the employee's length of service, and (2) a compensatory award based on the loss
suffered by the employee.
79. Id. § 78.
80. Id. §§ 22-28.
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that some four-fifths of the expected total cost of the Act, 100-120 mil-
lion pounds on the basis of 1974 estimates, 8' would be taken up by this
single provision, even though many companies already have more gener-
ous provisions in this area. The guarantee is for the employee's pay up
to a maximum of six pounds per day for any day during the whole of
which there is insufficient work for him. It is, however, limited to a
maximum of five days' pay in any calendar quarter, and there is no right
to the guarantee if the layoff is caused by a trade dispute involving that
employer or an associated employer. As with all the individual rights,
an employee may complain to an industrial tribunal on grounds of im-
proper treatment, and moreover any payment the individual may obtain
through a collective agreement or other contractual source will be de-
ducted from his statutory rights.
Another set of new individual rights which also has implications for
collective bargaining is concerned with rights to time off from work."
Time off is permitted for four different reasons. First, official union
representatives are entitled to reasonable amounts of time off with pay
to enable them to carry out their industrial relations duties and to
undergo industrial relations training.83 Second, employees who are
members of recognized trade unions are permitted time off without pay
for union activities during working hours.84 For both of these the ACAS
is instructed to produce a Code of Practice containing guidelines for
determining the time which may be reasonable." Third, there is a right
to unpaid time off for carrying out public duties, a range of which are
specified in the Act.88 For these activities no Code of Practice is pro-
posed; instead, three somewhat nebulous criteria are proposed for inter-
pretation by industrial tribunals-how much time off is required, how
much time off the employee has already had for union-related purposes,
and "the circumstances of the employer's business and the effect of the
employee's absence on the running of that business."" Fourth, if an
employee is to be declared redundant, he is entitled to reasonable time
off to look for alternative work, providing he has been employed for at
least two years. He is also entitled to be paid for this time off, but the
employer is not liable before a tribunal for more than two-fifths of the
81. The figure was given by the Minister of State at the Department of Employment,
Mr. Albert Booth. HANSARD (Parliamentary Debates), April 28, 1975, at col. 34.
82. Employment Protection Act §§ 57-62.
83. Id. § 57(1).
84. Id. § 58.
85. Id. 99 6(2)(b), 57-58.
86. Id. § 59.
87. Id. § 59(4).
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employee's weekly pay, indicating that two days is the period the Gov-
ernment has in mind as a reasonable allowance.8
The last major category of individual rights deals with the maternity
of women workers,"9 granting the rights of pay" and also returri to work
after the birth, provided minimum conditions of two years' employ-
ment and continuous employment until the eleventh week before the
expected birth are met.9' There is also a general explicit right not to be
dismissed during pregnancy even for a presumptively fair reason such
as incapability if there is a suitable alternative vacancy." Maternity pay
amounts to nine-tenths of a week's pay for a period of six weeks, being
the first six weeks of absence before the birth. A national Maternity
Fund is established based on employer contributions to ensure that the
cost of these payments is evenly shared by all employers. The right to
return to work exists for 29 weeks after the week of the birth; the woman
may return to the job she previously held, under the terms of the original
employment contract, together with any further privileges which might
have accrued in the interim. The employer may postpone the return for
up to four weeks, but failure to permit a return is treated as a dismissal.
If the employer has hired a replacement, the replacement may fairly be
dismissed upon the mother's return provided the employer originally
informed the replacement of the potential dismissal.
The other individual rights can be treated more briefly. The Act
grants employees extensive rights upon the insolvency of their employer,
a situation which has affected some 30,000 to 40,000 employees a year,
by authorizing the Secretary of State to pay employees the remunera-
tion due them out of the Redundancy Fund. 3 Employers must also pay
workers up to 26 weeks of wages if they are suspended on medical
grounds 4 by reason of any statute or recommendation in a Code of
Practice issued under the Health and Safety at Work Act.95 This latter
provision primarily covers orders to close down or improve dangerous or
unhealthy working places. Further rights deal with the contract of em-
ployment, including the requirement of an itemized pay statement,98
longer periods of notice before dismissal,9" a specification of the worker's
88. Id. § 61.
89. Id. §§ 34-52.
90. Id. §§ 36-38.
91. Id. §§ 48-50.
92. Id. § 34(2).
93. Id. §§ 63-66.
94. Id. §§ 29-33.
95. 1974 c. 37.
96. Employment Protection Act §§ 81-84.
97. Id., sched. 16, pt. II, 2, amending Contracts of Employment Act 1972, c. 53, §
1(b), (e).
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job title,9" an itemization of the disciplinary rules applicable to employ-
ees (or a reference to a document which specifies such rules)," and a
statement of the procedures for appeal against disciplinary actions. 00
Finally, there are a considerable number of minor and consequential
changes to existing legislation.''
In total, the Act is a formidable piece of legislation, and one which is
likely to produce significant changes in British industrial relations prac-
tice. Not all of it, however, is immediately applicable. Administrative
reasons such as the potential caseload of industrial tribunals and the
preparation of Codes of Practice will result in phased introduction of
some sections, while some of the more costly provisions, such as guaran-
teed pay and maternity pay, will not be introduced at least until 1977
for economic reasons. Nevertheless, the Act must be seen not only in its
narrow industrial relations sense, but also as part of the Government's
wider economic and social policy. The Minister introducing the bill in
Parliament stressed this fact when he called it "the clearest possible
evidence of the Government's commitment to the social contract, which
in our view remains the only realistic policy for containing inflation."'0 2
II
INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY
The third major piece of industrial relations legislation in the Labor
Government's program is that dealing with the difficult issue of in-
dustrial democracy. In 1973 the Trade Union Congress, after a long
period of disinterest in the subject, became converted to the idea of
worker representation on the boards of directors of industrial organiza-
tions,'0 3 and this was duly incorporated into Labor Party policy.," Al-
98. Employment Protection Act, sched. 16, pt. II, 4(b), amending Contracts of Em-
ployment Act 1972, c. 53, § 4(1).
99. Employment Protection Act, sched. 16, pt. II, 5(b), amending Contracts of Em-
ployment Act 1972, c. 53, § 4(2).
100. Employment Protection Act, sched. 16, pt. II, 5(b), amending Contracts of
Employment Act 1972, c. 53, § 4(2).
101. Employment Protection Act, sched. 16.
102. HANSARD (Parliamentary Debates), April 28, 1975, at cols. 46-47.
103. TUG GENERAL COUNCIL, INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY, INTERIM REPORT BY THE TUG GEN-
ERAL COUNCIL (1973). This was followed by a somewhat refined version, TUC GENERAL
COUNCIL, INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY (1974).
104. The most recent Labor Party statement on the topic is LABOR PARTY, THE COM-
MUNITY AND THE COMPANY: REFORM OF COMPANY LAW (Green Paper, 1974). The only point
at which there was a significant divergence from the TUC policy was in the responsibilities
of worker-directors, in which the Labor Green Paper argued that worker-directors could
not be completely free to pursue the interests of the workers alone, as the TUC had
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though there has been a great deal of discussion since then, there has
been little advance in clarity of conception or purpose, with even the
labor movement far from united. As a result the Government itself has
shown no signs of wanting to take rapid action. Pressure from its own
backbenchers through the unexpected progress of a private member's
bill,' 5 however, has precipitated the usual standby of uncertain or dila-
tory governments, a committee of inquiry.'6 Legislation has thus been
deferred until the 1976-77 session, and some difficulties in obtaining
membership for the committee may have put even that target in jeop-
ardy.
It is likely that legislation will be passed, although the precise content
and form is difficult to predict. Industrial democracy, "employee partic-
ipation," or "workers' control," as it is variously known, has been part
of the policy of all three main political parties, but outside the extremes
of the political spectrum there is little certainty as to how to translate
a desirable concept into practice, and it is still too early to assume that
board representation will become the main mode of workers' representa-
tion. The committee of inquiry has relatively little latitude; its function
is merely to decide how to set up a system of boardroom representation
rather than address the question of whether this is the best approach.
Indeed, it was the problem of restricted terms of reference which led to
problems of membership for the committee.' 7 Even this narrow aspect
of the topic, however, involves a host of problems, e.g., whether there
should be a one-or two-tier board of directors, what proportion of
worker-directors should there be, whether worker-directors should be
elected or even nominated through union channels or by the workers
directly, how a balance should be achieved between the different unions
in an enterprise, what responsibilities the worker-directors should
have, how difficulties of confidentiality can be overcome, what should
happen with respect to non-industrial and public organizations, for
suggested. There had been an examination of the issue in REPORT OF THE LABOR PARTY
WORKING PARTY ON INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY (1967), but this had no immediate conse-
quences.
105. The Industrial Democracy Bill, sponsored by Giles Radice, M.P., reached its Com-
mittee Stage and was only withdrawn on the promise of Government action.
106. The committee is to be chaired by Sir Alan Bullock of Oxford University. Mr. Peter
Shore, the responsible Minister, has asked for a report by the end of 1976. The TUC would
have preferred legislation based on its own document, and would only agree to the inquiry
if its terms of reference were tightly constrained.
107. The terms read in part: "Accepting the need for a radical extension of industrial
democracy in the control of companies by means of representation of boards of directors,
and by accepting the essential role trade union organisations in this process, to consider
how such an extension can best be achieved . Quoted from the Financial Times,
Aug. 7, 1975, at 14, cols. 5-6.
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what size of unit the system should be introduced and how should this
be achieved, and so on. It may be best to put these into perspective by
briefly reviewing both the British and European contexts.
A. COMMON MARKEr DEVELOPMENTS
Perhaps the most influential recent development in this area has been
Britain's entry into the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1973.
For some time before British entry, the EEC had been moving towards
a more cohesive policy on company law. The Draft Statute on European
Companies'0 8 proposed a scheme of employee participation for "Euro-
companies," i.e. those multinational companies which wish to register
on the basis of a supra-national company law to avoid operating under
several different sets of national company laws. It is a complex docu-
ment, but in essence it proposes a two-tier board system with one-third
worker representation on the supervisory board, and also makes provi-
sion for a European works council. The key aspect of the Draft Statute
is that companies may voluntarily choose whether or not to register; of
course, there may be pressure from unions and employees to do so. Still
more significant for the future is a second document, a Green Paper
issued by the Commission of the European Community in November
1975,109 stemming from the earlier Fifth Directive of 1972.111 The Green
Paper is far less detailed than the Draft Statute but, if ultimately
adopted, would affect national company law and be mandatory rather
than merely voluntary. The various countries of the EEC have been
approaching industrial democracy in different ways, and hence it would
be virtually impossible to have a single statutory framework. Neverthe-
less, as an EEC official put it: "If the EEC is to be really meaningful in
this field, the rights and legal status of a worker in Naples must be
similar to those of a worker in Edinburgh-though that doesn't mean
to say they must necessarily be exactly the same.""' Although the Euro-
108. Proposed Statute for the European Company, tit. 5, submitted by the Commission
of the European Economic Community to the Council of Ministers, June 30, 1970,
reprinted in EUROPEAN COMPANY LAW TEXTS 33-44 (C. Schmitthoff ed. 1974). A version of
the statute together with commentaries can be found in P. SANDERS, EUROPEAN STOCK
CORPORATION: TEXT OF DRAFT STATUTE WITH COMMENTARY (1969); for the most recent
amended text, see EUROPEAN INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS REPORT No. 7, July 1974.
109. COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, EMPLOYEE PARTICIPATION AND COMPANY
STRUCTURE IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY (CCH 1976).
110. Fifth Draft Directive, submitted by the Commission of the European Economic
Community to the Council of Ministers, Oct. 9, 1972, 15 E.E.C. J.0. 131/49 (1972),
reprinted in 1 CCH Comm. MKT. REP. 1401 (1974); EUROPEAN COMPANY LAW TEXTS 113-
33 (C. Schmitthoff ed. 1974).
111. Incomes Data Service Int'l Report No. 13, Nov. 1975, at 3.
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pean framework will undoubtedly be influential, there will be pressure
in Britain to diverge from general trends in Europe in at least the key
areas of bargaining at plant level and the role of works councils.
B. BRITISH DEVELOPMENTS
The British tradition of labor relations has principally been based on
shop steward-dominated workplace bargaining while the European tra-
dition, by contrast, has favored works councils."' The Trade Unions
Congress has unequivocally declared itself opposed to the latter ap-
proach, arguing that:
An attempt to introduce a general system of works councils in British
industry would lead to one of two things. Either they would duplicate
existing structures at plant level, in which Works Councils would clearly
be superfluous; or they would displace and supercede existing trade
union arrangements; this latter approach would be even more unaccept-
able to the trade union movement."3
The TUC firmly believes that the major way to extend collective control
of the workers over their work situation "will continue to be through the
strengthening of trade union organization, and the widening of the scope
of collective bargaining.""' Beyond the official TUC approach, there are
three separate views in opposition to board-level worker representation
which are held by different members of the labor movement: the far left
of the union movement believes that the policy would involve an unac-
ceptable compromise with capitalist institutions, the more traditional
unionists believe that proposed forms of representation will blur the
conflict relationship within collective bargaining, and all sides entertain
a more general worry that the new structure would find the unions
unprepared to provide adequate servicing in terms of personnel, re-
search, and organization.
British management, for its part, shows little enthusiasm for any of
the proposals, particularly dislikes a 50-50 system of board representa-
tion. It would, however, be prepared to accept a system of employee
participation based on consultation, and would contemplate works
councils provided these were not solely dominated by unions."' Some
individual companies, on the other hand, have either advanced or have
112. The British tradition has also been followed, to some extent, in Italy and Ireland.
113. INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY, supra note 103, at 40.
114. Id. at 27.
115. See CONFEDERATION OF BRITISH INDUSTRIES, THE RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE BRITISH
PUBLIC COMPANY (1973) and CITY COMPANY LAW COMMITTEE, EMPLOYEE PARTICIPATION
(1975).
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been forced into more liberal positions. British Leyland,"18 Harland and
Wolff,"' Ferranti, Alfred Herbert, and Chrysler have all proposed struc-
tures giving some representational rights beyond collective bargaining,
although all their proposals fall well short of equal boardroom represen-
tation. It is noteworthy that these companies are all ones which have
sought governmental financial assistance. The Government has sought
to sponsor industrial democracy not only by means of outside direct
legislative imposition, but also indirectly. Thus the Industry Act"' and
the Scottish and Welsh Development Agency Acts"9 state that one of
the objectives for the agencies they create is that of "promoting in-
dustrial democracy," although no guidance is given as to how this
should be done. Forthcoming legislation, such As the Bill to nationalize
the shipbuilding and aircraft industries, is liely to contain the same
objective.
In general, therefore, industrial democracy remains a fuzzy concept;
while it probably will be implemented initially through a system of
boardroom representation this will not be the end of the debate, and in
the longer term it is likely to develop in ways which are not yet evident.
IV
OTHER LEGISLATION
Besides the three statutory plans discussed above, there are several
other Acts and bills of a secondary significance in the development of
industrial relations which, although not part of the central planks of
Labor's industrial relations program, are still of considerable impor-
tance in their own right. Several of these measures represent a signifi-
cant advance into areas of industrial life hitherto subject to little statu-
tory regulation. Moreover, even if this legislation is less concerned with
the ideological aspects of industrial relations, and even if some of it had
partial origins in European influence or in proposals of the Conservative
Government, the final contents and administrative form of the various
Acts bear a distinct stamp of labor movement influence.
A. HEALTH AND SAFETY
The Health and Safety at Work Act 2' contains provisions which
116. See Financial Times, Oct. 29, 1975, at 18, cols. 3-8.
117. See NORTHERN IRELAND DEP'T OF MANPOWER SERVICES, INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY: A
DISCUSSION PAPER ON WORKER PARTICIPATION IN HARLAND AND WOLFF (1975).
118. 1975, c. 68.
119. 1975, chs. _.
120. 1974, c. 37.
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largely were inherited from the previous Conservative Government's
bill.'2 ' Previous British legislation in this field had been a morass of
statutes and regulations, and a special committee had recommended a
comprehensive updating measure.'1 The Act provides such an" update,
and also extends statutory safety protections to some five million work-
ers previously outside the orbit of any legislation and gives protection
to non-employees on industrial premises.
The Act is essentially an enabling measure since the new Health and
Safety Commission, the main administrative agency, will make recom-
mendations to the Secretary of State on the issuance of new regulations
which, over time, will extend, revise or replace the existing legislation.'2
These regulations will cover a wide range of safety, health, welfare, and
environmental matters at the workplace; one area in which regulation
may be particularly important is that of formulating licensing provi-
sions for work activities involving especially dangerous processes or ma-
terials. Beyond the regulations, two other types of obligations are im-
posed on employers: codes of practice for practical guidance, which the
Commission will issue,' 4 and general statutory duties laid down for
employers concerning obligations to their employees and the general
public, breach of which is an offence.'12 As a counterpart to these, there
is also a statement of the general duties of employees at work.1 2 1
The central aim of this legislation was to create an essentially self-
regulatory system for the adoption and observation of safety and health
standards in light of the investigating committee's discovery that people
had seen responsibility as lying too much on the law and the inspectors
and too little on themselves. Although there is an expected reduction in
the role of criminal prosecutions, the inspectorate has widespread pow-
ers to issue improvements and prohibition notices to remedy any viola-
121. A Conservative bill was presented to Parliament in January 1974, only to be
rapidly overtaken by the General Election the following month. This bill, in turn, had
been based on COMMIrrEE ON SAFETY AND HEALTH AT WORK, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE
(RoBENS COMMrrrEE), CMND. No. 5034 (1972), which had been appointed by the previous
Labor administration. That Labor Government had introduced a bill itself, but the 1970
General Election intervened.
122. See REPORT OF THE CoMirrEE, supra note 121.
123. Health and Safety at Work Act 1974, c. 37, §§ 10-14. Enforcement of the require-
ments for industrial premises is carried out by the Health and Safety Executive, a three-
member board which takes over functions of former Government inspectorates in several
industries. Id. §§ 10, 18. Local authorities are responsible for enforcement on non-
industrial premises. Id. § 18(2)-(5).
124. Id. § 16. These codes will not have direct legal enforceability but will be taken into
account in legal proceedings. Id. § 17.
125. Id. §§ 2-6.
126. Id. § 7.
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tion of statutory requirements, and can also prohibit any dangerous
activities.2 7 Employers have the right to appeal to industrial tribu-
nals.'1
The Act's major departure from the committee recommendations and
the Conservatives' earlier bill concerns the involvement and role of trade
unions. In the past there has been some consultation through estab-
lished management-worker safety committees, but the basic responsi-
bility for work place health and safety has been solely a management
one.'29 The investigating committee, although making some commit-
ment to the need for joint consultative machinery, saw no legitimate
scope for bargaining or negotiation over safety and health matters due
to a strong identity of interest between the parties. Under the new Act
the Secretary of State can make regulations providing for the appoint-
ment of workers' safety representatives with whom the employer is re-
quired to consult about arrangements. Safety committees are to be es-
tablished if requested by worker safety representatives.' 0 While the ac-
tual functions and powers of the committees and representatives are at
the present very much open-ended, it is certain that the regulations
when issued will further strengthen the role of the unions.' Already the
Employment Protection Act has amended the Health and Safety Act to
give unions the sole right to appoint safety representatives.3 2
The comprehensive, enabling nature of this legislation means that
there are few areas outside the achievement reach of regulations or codes
under the Act. However, experience under the United States' Occupa-
tional Safety and Health Act' and earlier safety legislation in Britain
indicates the overwhelming importance of the actual administrative
processes, and in particular the degree to which economic or production
considerations will be allowed to water down safety standards.
127. Id. §§ 21-22.
128. Id. § 24(2).
129. Cartwright v. G.K.N. Sankey, Ltd., 12 Knight's Ind. Rep. 453 (Q.B. 1972). See also
Atherley, Booth & Kelly, Workers' Involvement in Occupational Health and Safety in
Britain, 111 INT'L LAB. REv. 469 (1975).
130. Health and Safety at Work Act 1974, c. 37, § 2(5), (7).
131. Thus, the Trade Union Congress has confidently suggested guidelines for the safety
representatives, TRADE UNION CONGRESS, HEALTH AND SAFETY AT WORK: A TUC GUIDE 11
(1975), including facilities to carry out inspections of the work area at least every three
months or in the event of a notifiable accident or dangerous occurrence, to inspect any
documents relevant to health and safety, and to sign an inspection register to be set up
by the employer.
132. Employment Protection Act, supra note 34, § 116.
133. 84 Stat. 1590 (codified in scattered sections of 5, 15, 18, 29, 42, 49 U.S.C.). See
Wood, An Assessment of Three Years of OSHA: Labor View, PROCEEDINGS OF THE IN-
DUSTRIAL RELATIONS RESEARCH ASSOCIATION 43 (1974).
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B. SEX DISCRIMINATION
As a complement to the coverage of the contractual terms and condi-
tions of employment by the 1970 Equal Pay Act, 34 which has been in
full effect since December 29, 1975, Labor took up the lead of the pre-
vious Governmentln and passed the Sex Discrimination Act 36 outlawing
sex discrimination in the remaining areas of the employment relation-
ship as well as in such areas as training, education, housing, and the
providing of goods and services to the public.
Provisions of the Act outlawing discrimination in employment on sex
and marriage grounds were drafted to reflect many of the negative les-
sons of the 1968 Race Relations Act.'37 In particular, proof of unlawful
discrimination does not, as in the Race Relations Act, rest solely on
motive, i.e. on the presence of actual or inferred intention to discrimi-
nate. Rather, the definition approximates the United States approach
3
of looking at the effects: any employment condition or requirement
which in practice can be fulfilled by only a significantly smaller number
of women than men constitutes unlawful discrimination. An important
issue here for the future will undoubtedly be the impact of past discrimi-
nation patterns on the present ability of females to meet various em-
ployment conditions and standards. As in the United States, this raises
the awkward issue of whether "reverse discrimination" is necessary to
overcome the effects of past discriminatory practices.
Although a small number of exceptions are specified where sex con-
stitutes a genuine occupational qualification,1 39 the Act makes it explicit
that cost advantages to the employers, even where they could be demon-
strated statistically due to factors such as differential turnover or absen-
134. 1970, c. 41. For statements of progress on the phasing in of this legislation, see
OFFICE OF MANPOWER ECONOMICS, EQUAL PAY: FIRST REPORT ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
EQUAL. PAY ACT, 1970 (1972), and Further Progress Towards Equal Pay, 83 DEP'T EMPLOY-
MENT GAZETTE 747 (1975).
135. As with health and safety, the Conservative Government had intended legislation
in the field of sex discrimination, only to have it overtaken by the February 1974 General
Election. For details of the Conservative Consultative Document, see INDUSTRIAL RELA-
TIONS REVIEW AND REPORT No. 65 at 3-7 (1973).
136. 1975, c. 65.
137. 1968, c. 71. This was made explicit in HoME DEPARTMENT, EQUALITY FOR WOMEN,
CMND. No. 5724 (White Paper, 1974).
138. Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-15
(1970), the Circuit Courts of Appeal have held that a prima facie case of discrimination
may be made on the basis of statistics showing the severely disproportionate number of
minorities employed in comparison with the number residing in the area. See Parham v.
Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., 433 F.2d 421, 426 (8th Cir. 1970).
139. These provisions are similar to the "bona fide occupational qualification" provi-
sions in Title VII. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (1970).
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teeism rates between the sexes, are unacceptable as a justification for
discrimination. Also unacceptable for exemption is discrimination ex-
posing an employee to adverse working conditions, although this may
be in conflict with the section of the Act which retains the protective
clauses for females under the 1961 Factories Act and associated legisla-
tion. Again looking at the American record, it is clear that a decision
must be made between protection and equality of opportunity and treat-
ment.40
The real novelty and strength of the Act lies in its machinery for
enforcement, which differs from the Conservative Government's propos-
als. After attempts at conciliation, the complainant may seek legal re-
dress through the industrial tribunals, although he or she bears the
burden of proving discrimination. This procedure is linked with the
strategic functions of the newly created Equal Opportunities Commis-
sion, which is the primary agent of change in this field. At the same
time, the Commission is not to be hamstrung, as was the Equal Employ-
ment Opportunities Commission in the United States before 1972,"'
because of a lack of statutory powers to compel enforcement: the failure
of an employer to comply with a nondiscrimination notice issued by the
Commission can lead to a Commission injunction against the employer
in a County Court.
C. RACIAL DISCRIMINATION
In the White Paper on Equality for Women' the Government stated
its intention to harmonize the powers and procedures for dealing with
racial and sex discrimination. Subsequently the Home Office published
a White Paper on racial discrimination, 3 the provisions of which it
hopes will be law by October 1976. Aiming to tighten the loopholes and
ambiguities revealed in the operation of the 1968 Race Relations Act,
the Act would provide for a widened definition of unlawful discrimina-
tion concentrating on effects rather than motive, the establishment of a
new body-the Race Relations Commission-to replace the Race Rela-
tions Board and the Community Relations Commission, and would
grant the right to obtain legal redress in industrial tribunals as in the
sex discrimination legislation. Firms obtaining Government contracts
140. See Munts & Rice, Women Workers: Protection or Equality, 24 IND. & LAB. REL.
REv. 3 (1970).
141. See Gunther, Special Complaint Procedures Concerning Discrimination in
Employment, 104 INT'L LAB. REV. 351, 354-55 (1971).
142. See note 137 supra.
143. HOME OFFICE, RACIAL DISCRIMINATION, CMND. No. 6234 (White Paper, 1975).
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would also have to supply to the Department of Employment informa-
tion about their employment policies and practices.'
D. INDUSTRIAL RECONSTRUCTION
The highly controversial 1975 Industry Act'" has three main provi-
sions concerning industrial relations. First, it provides for a state in-
dustrial holding company, the National Enterprise Board,'46 in which
unions will be represented at board level, and which, as already noted,'47
has among its functions that of promoting industrial democracy. Sec-
ond, the Act provides for a system of voluntary planning agreements as
a means of dovetailing Government and enterprise plans and actions in
key sectors of the economy. Established through tripartite Govern-
ment/company/union consultation and discussion, these planning
agreements will cover 100-150 major export-oriented companies and will
concern matters such as investment, employment, exports, productiv-
ity, and product and process development. Unions will not be signato-
ries to the agreements, which are themselves not enforceable at law, and
the extent and detail of their functions and involvement in the planning
process have been diminished considerably from the original proposals.
Even so, there is substantial scope in the consultation process for union
influence on company policy. The third relevant facet of the Act is that
the Secretary of State is empowered to serve notice on any large com-
pany in a key economic sector, whether or not it has signed a planning
agreement, requiring the disclosure of information on matters such as
employment, company plans for the acquisition and disposal of capital
assets, output, productivity, and various other matters. The Secretary
can require some or all of this information to be passed on to the relevant
trade union representatives, although it may be accompanied with var-
ious safeguards. A Committee is to be appointed to hear union and
company appeals on disclosure and to advise the Secretary of State on
the matter, although the ultimate decision is his alone.
144. This is similar to the provisions of Exec. Order No. 11,246, 3 C.F.R. 339 (1964-65),
42 U.S.C. § 2000e n. (1970) in the United States, and the problems revealed in its opera-
tion may serve as a warning to British policy. See United States Commission on Civil
Rights, The Federal Civil Rights Enforcement Effort, in DAILY LAB. REP. No. 30, Feb. 13,
1973, at E 1-5.
145. 1975, c. 68. This was originally viewed by industry as the first step in a radical
program aiming at extensive Government control of the private sector. However, the
replacement of Mr. Benn by Mr. Varley as Secretary of State for Industry resulted in a
more moderate sponsorship that helped allay many early fears.
146. Special agencies have been created in separate legislation for Scotland and Wales,
i.e. the Scottish Development Agency and the Welsh Development Agency, although the
National Enterprise Board will have jurisdiction over the whole of Great Britain.
147. See notes 118-19 supra and accompanying text.
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E. DOCK LABOR
The final area presently earmarked for legislation is that of dock-side
employment. An intraunion dispute between the dock and road haulage
sections of the Transport and General Workers Union precipitated pub-
lication of a Consultative Document in March 1975,48 and a bill has now
been introduced which (1) proposes to extend the present statutory
closed shop for dock workers to all significant commercial ports and
wharves, and (2) adopts a definition of "port transport work," which
limits employment to registered dock workers, covering a five mile corri-
dor from the waterside. This measure is bound to arouse considerable
Parliamentary opposition; indeed the Shadow Employment Secretary
has already described it as "one of the most damaging measures to be
put in front of the Commons for years."'49 There is also little doubt that,
if passed, this measure would impinge on TUC rules which are designed
to cope with interunion conflicts of jurisdiction.
CONCLUSION
If we assume the enactment of the various bills yet to be passed by
Parliament, the scheme of legislation described in this article may well
be the most comprehensive reconstruction of industrial relations in such
a short space of time anywhere in the world. It also represents the most
direct influence of an independent labor movement in any country; even
accepting the traditionally strong influence of the unions on the Labor
Party, never before has it been given what amounts to a carte blanche
to sponsor its own legislation. The measures are almost entirely pro-
union or pro-worker, and impose virtually no constraints on either. In-
deed, a continuing theme has been the Labor Government's concern,
amounting to an obsession, to prevent any conflict between labor and
the legal system. Yet there is another side to the story, and one which
requires mentioning to give a correct perspective. Much of the legisla-
tion was enacted as part of the "social contract,"'' 0 and this concept
148. Dockworkers'Scheme-New Proposals, 83 DEP'T EMPLOYMENT GAzErrE 322 (1975).
149. POLrrIcs TODAY, Dec. 15, 1975, at 96.
150. The social contract originated in the TUC-Labor Party Liaison Committee's joint
statement Economic Policy and the Cost of Living in February 1973, which emphasized
the need for a coherent economic and social strategy to overcome the nation's grave
economic problems and to provide the basis for cooperation between the unions and any
future Labor Government. As developed over the following year and included in the Labor
Party Manifesto for the February 1974 General Election, it committed such a Government
to a far-reaching program which included not only the three major industrial relations
measures discussed in this paper but also control over prices, the sponsoring of invest-
ment, a freeze on housing rents, food subsidies, and much greater spending on social
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imposes on the labor movement an obligation to maintain a system of
income control. When Labor came to power, the Trade Union Congress,
as its part of the social contract, offered to implement the remaining
period of Phase III of the Conservative Government's incomes policy.151
This was followed in August 1974 by TUC guidelines for collective bar-
gaining, 5 2 and when these proved inadequate to keep down the rapidly
rising wage spiral, yet another, but much tougher, TUC policy was
imposed.5 3 Although this policy is due to last for only a single year, up
to August 1976, it is highly likely that a similar policy will replace it in
spite of the continuing antagonism of many unions and Labor Party
members to any constraints on free collective bargaining. In other
words, the TUC, although exercising great power, has been forced into
a position of assuming responsibility for moderating the potentially in-
flationary effects of that power. At the same time, the sanctions which
the Government has promised to bring into play if the incomes policy
does not work will be directed at employers through the price control
system, and not in any way at unions or workers.
What of the future of the legislation? Given the poor record of law in
the British industrial relations system, a cynic might be forgiven for
doubting its impact, or expecting it to be revised by the next Conserva-
tive Government. To expect either eventuality, however, would be an
error. First, although there is bound to be a process of digestion as all
parties, including the workers themselves, realize and begin to imple-
ment their rights and obligations, implementation thereafter will be
rapid in unionized plants, and the legislation's impact will strongly be
felt. This will come about first as a result of the plant bargaining pro-
cess, as stewards and their members seek new sources of advantage or
as employers try to preempt any such demands, and only secondarily
by recourse to law. Further, there is another reason to believe that the
legislation will not be a dead letter: the labor movement is increasingly
playing a direct executive and policy-making role through council mem-
bership of the agencies which now dominate employment policy-the
priorities. For its part, the TUC recognized the need to control inflation by means of
income restraint. At this point, however, there was no intention of introducing an incomes
policy as such; rather, the TUC undertook that negotiations would be influenced by the
constructive policies of the new Government.
151. For a review of this policy, see Hunter, British Incomes Policy, 1972-1974, 29 IND.
& LAB. REL. REV. 67 (1975).
152. TRADE UNION CONGRESS, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AND THE SOCIAL CONTRACT (1974).
153. TRADE UNION CONGRESS, THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SOCIAL CONTRACT (1975). In
essence, this policy gives all workers six pounds per week up to 8,500 pounds per year,
and nothing more. The policy suggested in this document was adopted almost verbatim
by the Governmemt in THE ATTACK ON INFLATION, CMND. No. 6151 (White Paper 1975).
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Health and Safety Commission, the Advisory Conciliation and Arbitra-
tion Service, and the Manpower Services Commission-and this will
give it a further means of initiating and monitoring developments. The
second possibility, repeal by an incoming Conservative Government, is
also unlikely. The Conservative approach towards the unions was de-
stroyed by the failure of the Industrial Relations Act and by the two
confrontations with the mineworkers.1 4 As a result, they have been left
without a viable industrial relations policy, and in spite of a move to
the right under their new leader, Mrs. Thatcher, the Conservatives have
only one path left: a conciliatory one. Indeed, on the passage of the
Trade Union and Labour Relations Act in 1974 the Conservative spokes-
man, James Prior, said that the Act "can now stand as a solid founda-
tion for our law on trade union organization and on the legal framework
in collective bargaining. There will be no need for further substantial
legislation in these particular areas."' 5 The Conservatives are also com-
mitted to the development of employee participation, and in the same
speech, Mr. Prior said: "We need to catch up with developments in
Europe. We need to develop the new themes of employee participation
and employee involvement. We need to find ways of improving the
arrangements for redundancy payments. We need to find a new ap-
proach to the improvement of the quality of life at work."' 50 To a consid-
erable extent, therefore, the two major parties have similar views on
legislative needs.
There are likely to be remaining areas of controversy, however. The
question of press freedom remains an embroiled issue. The Conserva-
tives may also try to push for a broad right of the individual to opt out
of union membership in a closed shop situation, especially since many
unions are currently seeking to extend the closed shop into new areas.
Another important issue is the question of state benefits during strikes,
which the 1975 Conservative Party Conference pledged itself to reconsi-
der. The matter of state assistance to unions in carrying out postal
ballots for elections is a further possible area of future legislation, al-
though it may generate a bipartisan debate, since this issue has numer-
ous sympathizers on the Labor side.'57 Finally, there is the difficult
question of picketing. This is the one major area where the TUC and
154. There were two major coal strikes in 1972 and 1974, the first of which forced the
Conservatives to introduce an incomes policy and the second of which resulted in the
February 1974 election and the fall of the Government. See Hunter, supra note 151.
155. Address by James Prior, Aug. 9, 1974.
156. Id.
157. Former Prime Minister Wilson declared himself in favor of postal ballots. Chroni-
cle of Industrial Relations, BRIT. J. INDUS. REL. 408 (Nov. 1975).
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the Labor Party diverged in the recent legislation and the Labor Govern-
ment's proposals in the Employment Protection Bill were not accepta-
ble to the unions.' 5 Any further attempt to strengthen the law in favor
of the unions would certainly be strongly opposed by the opposition
parties.
The European model of regulatory industrial relations will continue
to influence British labor policy. It can be argued that this would have
occurred even if Britain had not joined the European Economic Com-
munity-in fact, the TUC was in favor of taking Britain out of the
Common Market in the 1975 referendum-nevertheless, the influence of
Europe to date has been important if indirect, and it will grow in the
future since European policy created through the various institutions
tends to be long-term in nature.'59 The present bases of Community
policy are threefold: (1) the European Commission's Social Action Pro-
gram of 1973,160 (2) the creation of common features of company law,
158. Although the 1971 Act made only minor substantive changes in the picketing
clause of the Trade Disputes Act of 1906, 6 Edw. 7, c. 47, i.e., the 1971 Act does not
authorize picketing at a person's residence, there was widespread public concern at mass
and occasionally violent picketing. Furthermore, the unions themselves were concerned
when picketing law was thrown into a state of some confusion by the common law cases
of Broome v. Director of Public Prosecutions, [1974] 1 All E.R. 314 (H.L.), and Kavanagh
v. Hiscock, [19741 2 All E.R. 177 (Q.B.), giving considerable discretion to the police in
evaluating a potential breach of the peace or an obstruction of the highway and making
it clear that there is no right to stop a driver against his will. The TUC wanted the explicit
right to stop vehicles entering or leaving premises for the purpose of peaceful persuasion,
and this was written into the consultative document for the Trade Union & Labor Rela-
tions Act in April 1974. After an outcry from employers and the Conservative Party, it
was withdrawn before the bill was published, but a further promise was made for its
reintroduction in the Employment Protection Bill. When this latter appeared, however,
Clause 99 did not meet the demands of the TUC, since it set out rights "falling short of
obstruction of the highway." Mr. Foot stated in Parliament his difficulty in reconciling
the union viewpoint with that of the police and road haulage employers; this was one of
the very few times when Mr. Foot parted company from the TUC. Clause 99, however,
did not survive, falling after the failure of a left-wing attempt to allow stopping vehicles.
The issue therefore remains alive and may be brought back to prominence by action
during a strike.
159. For a general review of European social policy, see M. FOGARTY, WORK AND IN-
DUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY (1975).
160. In the Social Action Program certain features were picked out for short-term im-
plementation, such as programs for migrant workers and handicapped workers, the imple-
mentation of equal pay for equal work, the institution of a 40-hour week and four weeks
paid annual holidays, the harmonizing of laws on collective dismissals, the extension of
the Mines Safety and Health Commission and the creation of a Foundation for the im-
provement of the environment and living and working conditions. Other elements of the
Social Action Program will cover such issues as retraining, sexual equality in the labor
market, cooperation between national employment services, the problems of special
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including the aspects of industrial democracy already discussed,'"' and
(3) proposals to handle the special problems caused by multinational
companies. In these areas the Community will operate through a frame-
work of objectives. It has no power to impose detailed codes, since cul-
tural conditions vary considerably and in any case any country can use
its veto in the Council of Ministers, but it does have strong influence in
promoting a general harmonization of standards and the Commission in
particular has an important leadership role. Industrial democracy is one
area where Britain lags behind European practice, at least in terms of
statutory rights, and European influence there has therefore been im-
portant. Several of the job protection aspects of the Employment Pro-
tection Act were influenced by Community initiatives."2 On the other
hand, several of the other measures described in the paper carry Britain
ahead of European practice.'63
Finally, although the new legislation will have immense effects on the
British industrial relations system, it cannot of itself resolve all the
problems which have plagued Britain over the past decade and more.
Here the plant remains'the key. It is unfortunate that the recent empha-
sis on legislation has tended to deflect attention away from bargaining
reform at plant level, which the Donovan Commission and the approach
of the American "model" emphasized. Some improvemnts have been
achieved in this area, but much remains to be done if industrial rela-
tions in Britain are to develop stability. One thing, however, remains
clear: Britain has moved well away from the old concept of state absten-
tion and is becoming much more like other national industrial relations
systems in its acceptance of state intervention. The major difference is
that it lacks a code of restrictive law, but even this may not be impor-
tant if, as is likely, there is a series of negotiated or imposed incomes
policies stretching well into the future.
groups such as school-leavers and elderly workers, labor market forecasting, a range of
social security measures, and aspects of the quality of working life.
161. See section I.A. supra.
162. Thus the EEC Council in February 1975 adopted a directive on collective dismiss-
als requiring employer consultation with worker representatives, which influenced the
redundancy procedures of the Employment Protection Act. Directive on the approxima-
tion of the laws of the Member States relating to collective redundancies, Feb. 17, 1975,
18 E.E.C. J.O. 48/29 (1975).
163. For example, there has been a growing interest in Europe in the British system of
shop stewards as a concomitant to the existing plant-level institutions based on works
councils. See J. BARBASH, TRADE UNIONS AND NATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY ch. VIII (1972).
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